We are starting on a fun project at A&A. Well, to be fair there are a few major projects going on, but this is likely to be one of mine rather than the ops team, at least to start with...
There is this horrid term BT use, "KCI", which is Keeping Customer Informed. They have these stages KCI-1, KCI-2, and so on.
But, in spite of the annoying term, the principle is reasonably good, and we are working on a system for A&A.
The basic concept is that there are a lot of cases where automated systems (usually) need to update a customer on some progress of something - whether an order or a fault or something else. At the moment we have a lot of systems, some of which get KCIs from BT or TT, and trigger events, some from our own systems, some as a result of an action by staff or a customer, etc. There are some consistent systems for some subsets of what we do, but nothing as a whole.
So the plan is to make a new system, a general purpose system, that can easily be bolted in to all of the systems in place of what we do now, and be consistent and helpful to customers.
The first issue we identified is there are two main grades of notice to customers. The simple "short message" type thing such as "order accepted by BT", "appointment booked for the 3rd, 8am-1pm", etc. The second type is more detailed long messages we currently send by email, such as the detailed order confirmations, or notices about open DNS servers, etc.
The short messages can be sent in many ways, and we currently, for some parts of our network, have messages with a choice of SMS, Twitter or email. These are all ideal for the simple short message type notifications.
So the plan is to allow customers to define, at various levels, e.g. a control page login, where they want notifications sent, and maybe even more than one place at once. Also, especially with text messages, time windows such as (8am-8pm Mon-Fri), etc, so not woken by unimportant messages. We may in future be able to extend to Signal, or WhatsApp, or whatever, where there are APIs.
We have to allow for message to be time sensitive, e.g. no point sending a message about an appointment after the appointment has happened. We may have to delay some messages, e.g. if a line is flapping, the line up/down messages get delayed (for both cost and annoyance reasons). We may also have to pair and cancel messages, e.g. if you have texts 8am-8pm but at 3am your line drops and reconnects a minute later then those two messages can cancel out and not be sent at 8am. We have to also consider load and rate limits on things like texts.
Now, when we get to emails it is also a bit fun. These can be used for the simple texts and for longer notices we send. We already try to sign most emails with an automation signature, but we are considering encrypting emails. We have been asked about this by a few customers, and we need a central system to handle this (makes no sense for everyone to have their own keyring). Our ticketing system could do it for us even.
So how would customers register a public key. Well, the plan is they email it to us, and we send them an encrypted email with a link to confirm the email address. Once done, we have a database of customer public keys and email addresses to use for sending email.
That is pretty simple, and the wonders of GPGME library have been impressing me for the last two days.
The huge problem is turning it off. Technically simple, and we can have have a staff interface for that, but the issue is policy. If someone wants encryption and has any risk of emails being read in transit, they do not want someone to just be able to phone up and turn off encrypted emails from us. Indeed, we cannot even sent a link to confirm which is not in fact encrypted to be safe. Sending an encrypted link will work for someone simply wanting to turn it off, but what of when someone loses a key??
Indeed, even accepting a replacement public key is tricky as it could be sent by someone that has means to intercept email, and they can then extract the confirmation link from our reply as they made the key.
Obviously the traditional face to face key signing is not practical on scale.
We could use customer login, 2FA, and so on, but how do we know the email they are using is really them. They could use their account but with someone else's email address which they have means to intercept, even if temporarily.
I am slightly at a loss on best practice on this at the moment. Comments welcome.
I suspect the best we will do is create policy and a good practice which minimises risk, but can never be bullet proof.
No guarantees on timescales yet, and it will be a gradual deployment, but watch this space...
P.S. PGP/MIME is a pile of shit, IMHO, so far.
P.S. One issue is that we are not expecting to register public keys "per account" or "per login" but "per target email address". We would send an encrypted reply with confirmation link. This makes validating changes or removal more complex.
P.S. After a lot of work on the library, I am the PGP/MIME king - all working as expected.
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